Escaping the Abdication Trap When Cooperative Federalism Fails: Legal Reform After Flint by Dana, David A.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 44
Number 5 Symposium - How the Poor Still Pay More:
A Reexamination of Urban Poverty in the Twenty-First
Century
Article 2
2017
Escaping the Abdication Trap When Cooperative
Federalism Fails: Legal Reform After Flint
David A. Dana
Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
David A. Dana, Escaping the Abdication Trap When Cooperative Federalism Fails: Legal Reform After Flint, 44 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1329
(2017).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol44/iss5/2
	 1329
ESCAPING THE ABDICATION TRAP WHEN 
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM FAILS: LEGAL 
REFORM AFTER FLINT 
David A. Dana* 
ABSTRACT 
Flint has focused national attention on problems in drinking water 
and, more broadly, failings in our cooperative federalism regarding 
environmental regulation.  This Article argues that, with respect to 
our federal regime for safe drinking water, what we observe is a triple 
abdication: abdication of responsibility on the part of the federal, 
state, and local governments.  This Article proposes making states 
(and not just local water authorities) legally responsible for testing 
water for lead and for disclosing test results.  In addition, the Article 
argues that water test results and other relevant information should 
be made available to residents in visually-powerful, interactive, on-
line maps.  Making states legally responsible and implementing new, 
substantive requirements for testing and disclosure would help 
motivate and empower citizens to lobby for public funding and would 
make citizen suit litigation a more effective tool to combat abdication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in 2014, the residents of Flint, Michigan were poisoned 
by lead in their drinking water.1  Federal, state, and local officials 
ignored citizen complaints about their drinking water, despite the fact 
that a university laboratory confirmed the presence of high levels of 
lead in the water in August 2015.2  As a Task Force appointed by 
Michigan’s governor concluded, “[t]he significant consequences of 
these failures for Flint will be long-lasting.  They have deeply affected 
Flint’s public health, its economic future, and residents’ trust in 
government.”3 
Flint is one example of a larger phenomenon I label “the 
abdication trap.”  A great deal of health, safety, and environmental 
law in the United States comports with a model that has been dubbed 
“cooperative federalism,” in which states are called upon to be 
regulatory partners with the federal government in the 
implementation of federal programs.4  While much of the literature 
and the law of cooperative federalism focuses on federal-state 
relations,5 the reality is that the key relationships often are not only 
between federal and state officials but also between state and local 
officials.  Broadly speaking, the federal government delegates 
responsibility to the states, and the states delegate responsibility to a 
range of local entities.6  With each delegation, there is supposed to be 
a commitment to ongoing supervision and, if need be, a re-
assumption of authority by the delegator from the delegate in order 
																																																																																																																																
 1. See Cara Cunningham Warren, An American Reset—Safe Water & A 
Workable Model of Federalism, 27 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 51, 52 (2016). 
 2. Id. at 52, 79. 
 3. FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 1 (2016) [hereinafter 
TASK FORCE REPORT], http://flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Flint-
task-force-report_2438442_ver1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/598N-TZU2]. 
 4. See Ronald J. Krotoszyski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, The New Formalism, 
and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of 
Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 
DUKE L.J. 1599, 1602 (2012) (outlining a conception of cooperative federalism). 
 5. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation 
of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 472–79 (2012) (discussing cooperative federalism 
generally as a federal-state government dynamic). 
 6. See Justin Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 
839, 841 (2017) (“Much federal law regulates the conduct of states.  States, in turn, 
delegate many of their federal responsibilities to local governments.”). 
2017] LEGAL REFORM AFTER FLINT 1331 
to meet the aims of the relevant regulatory regime.  Especially in the 
environmental context, as with the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act,7 
citizen suits add another layer of complexity to governance. 
This Article argues that, with respect to our federal regime for safe 
drinking water, what we observe is not cooperative federalism but 
rather a triple abdication: abdication of responsibility on the part of 
the federal, state, and local governments.8  As a result, some localities 
inadequately test for or fail to address problems in drinking water, 
including problems with lead, as in Flint, Michigan.9  The triple 
abdication of responsibility for addressing lead in water is in large 
part due to the lack of political will at the federal and state level to 
provide localities with the funding they realistically would need to 
upgrade their infrastructure to remove lead pipes.10  The relevant 
actors do not want to know, or do, anything about such problems 
because there is simply not enough political will to secure the funding 
to solve them. 
This Article argues that the best way to address the deficit in 
political will would be legal reforms in our safe drinking water regime 
																																																																																																																																
 7. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8 (West 2017). 
 8. Scholars have largely ignored the question of how the Safe Drinking Water 
Act and other drinking water statutes fit within the larger framework of cooperative 
federalism.  A notable exception is A. Daniel Tarlock, Safe Drinking Water: A 
Federalism Perspective, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 233 (1997) 
(arguing that the drinking water law embodies mixed, often conflicting conceptions of 
federalism). 
 9. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 43–45 (detailing the failures in 
Flint). 
 10. See Warren, supra note 1, at 70 (discussing political will as a cause of failures 
of federal drinking water programs at the local level).  In December of 2016, 
Congress did pass the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act 
(“WIIN”) in an effort to improve drinking water infrastructure and authorize funding 
for communities, like Flint, facing drinking water emergencies. See Pub. L. No. 114-
322, 130 Stat. 1628 (2016); see also Press Release, Debbie Stabenow, U.S. Senator for 
Mich., Senate Passes Agreement to Provide Critical Help for Flint and Other 
Communities, Clearing Way for President’s Signature (Dec. 10, 2016), 
https://www.stabenow.senate.gov/news/senate-passes-agreement-to-provide-critical-
help-for-flint-and-other-communities-clearing-way-for-presidents-signature 
[https://perma.cc/5BFD-K8B7].  Though its passage was touted as a bipartisan 
success, WIIN and the funding that it provided fall staggeringly short of what will be 
necessary to ensure the public has access to drinking water that is free from lead 
contamination. See Auditi Guha, Federal Funding for Flint Water Crisis ‘Just a Tiny 
Start,’ REWIRE (Mar. 23, 2017, 5:28 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2017/03/23/
federal-funding-for-flint-water-crisis-just-a-tiny-start/ [https://perma.cc/6ZY7-PVUC]; 
see also Christine Grimaldi, Flint Activist: Federal Aid Won’t Come Close to 
Addressing ‘Human Cost,’ REWIRE (Dec. 13, 2016, 10:18 AM), 
https://rewire.news/article/2016/12/13/flint-activist-federal-aid-come-close-addressing-
human-cost/ [https://perma.cc/772X-AYXZ]. 
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that will provide those at risk of lead poisoning with clear, readily-
understandable information regarding the risks they face.  In 
particular, this Article proposes making not just local water 
authorities, but states legally responsible for testing water for lead 
and disclosing test results.  In addition, the Article argues for water 
test results and other relevant information to be made available to 
residents in visually-powerful, interactive, on-line maps.  Making 
states legally responsible and implementing new substantive 
requirements for testing and disclosure would help motivate and 
empower citizens to lobby for public funding and make citizen suit 
litigation a more effective tool to combat abdication.  Prompted by 
the crisis in Flint, there have been calls for state-level reform, and 
some actual reform in Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, and California,11 that 
suggest that the proposals in this Article, which would require 
legislation at the state level, might be politically achievable. 
Part I of this Article reviews the current legal regime, which is 
governed by the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act and the Lead and 
Copper Rule, and the abundant evidence of abdication of 
responsibility within that regime.  Part II addresses the question of 
why we see abdication of responsibility at the federal, state, and local 
levels, focusing on lead contamination’s lack of political salience and 
hence the lack of political will as a primary explanation.  Part III 
advocates measures to more reliably and effectively produce and 
disseminate information about lead in water directly to those who 
face risk of lead poisoning.  Finally, the Article takes up some 
possible objections to its state-level, information-focused approach to 
reform. 
I.  THE DRINKING WATER REGIME IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 
Although the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”)12 has 
been the subject of Congressional revisions since its initial passage in 
1974, the basic structure has remained the same.  “The 1974 law 
established the current federal-state arrangement in which states may 
be delegated primary implementation and enforcement authority for 
the drinking water program.”13  Forty-nine states have assumed 
primary implementation and enforcement authority, and “[t]he state-
administered Public Water Supply Supervision (PWSS) Program” has 
																																																																																																																																
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 114–18 (discussing state reforms in the 
wake of Flint). 
 12. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-27 (West 2017). 
 13. MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31243, SAFE DRINKING WATER 
ACT (SDWA): A SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 1 (2014). 
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been and “remains the basic program for regulating the nation’s 
water systems[.]”14 
States thus are the primary enforcers of the SDWA, but to achieve 
and maintain primacy under section 1413 of the SDWA, “states must 
adopt regulations at least as stringent as national requirements, 
develop adequate procedures for enforcement (including conducting 
monitoring and inspections), adopt authority for administrative 
penalties, and maintain records and make reports as the Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) requires.”15  As with all 
delegated authority arrangements, states, as the delegated enforcers 
of the SDWA, are not legally responsible or liable for substantive 
violations of the Act; the only liable parties are the “owners” and 
“operators” of  “public water systems [that must] monitor their water 
supplies to ensure compliance with drinking water standards and to 
report monitoring to the states.”16  The state has obligations to the 
federal government as long as it remains the primary enforcer of the 
SDWA pursuant to a federal delegation of authority, but a state need 
not continue to occupy that role.17 
The SDWA not only gives a state authority to enforce the Act 
when the federal government has delegated primacy to it, but it also 
allows for federal inspections and administrative and civil 
enforcement actions against owners or operators of local water 
authorities, after providing the prescribed notice to the appropriate 
state officials.18  In addition, the SDWA includes a citizen suit 
provision whereby any citizen may sue “any person . . . who is alleged 
to be in violation of any requirement prescribed by or under this 
subchapter.”19 
																																																																																																																																
 14. Id.  Note that the EPA has never withdrawn primacy from a state after 
granting it. 
 15. Id. at 6; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-2 (West 2017). 
 16. TIEMANN, supra note 13, at 7; see also Reply Brief in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss for Defs. State Treasurer & Members of the Flint Receivership Transition 
Advisory Bd. at 3, Concerned Pastors for Social Action v. Khouri, 194 F. Supp. 3d 
589, 605 (2016) (No. 16-10277) (explaining that “[t]he SDWA applies to ‘owners’ and 
‘operators’ of a public water system.”). 
 17. See Warren, supra note 1, at 62–63 (noting that as of 2016, all states except 
Wyoming have opted for primacy). 
 18. TIEMANN, supra note 13, at 7, 13 (discussing Sections 1444 and 1414 of the 
SDWA); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3 (West 2017) (codifying Section 1414 of the 
SDWA and reflecting 2016 amendments that clarified and expanded notice 
requirements); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-3 (West 2017) (codifying Section 1444 of the 
SDWA). 
 19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8 (West 2017). 
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In theory, then, there is both delegation and accountability in the 
SDWA regime, as the model of cooperative federalism requires: 
localities must report testing data and noncompliance to the states, 
and the states must report such information to the EPA.20  Both 
federal and state governments can bring informal or formal 
enforcement actions, and the EPA retains the right to cancel its 
delegation of primacy to a state and become the primary enforcer of 
federal drinking water law in a state.21  In theory, the involvement of 
three levels of government in the problem of drinking water 
contamination guards against failure at any one level of government.  
As a number of federalism scholars have argued, having multiple and 
even redundant sources of government regulation can help ensure 
that an objective is achieved, since failure by one or more sources can 
be checked by others.22  In an ideal world, the SDWA regime would 
work such that, if localities failed to meet their responsibilities, there 
would be distinct checks: the states and, if the states failed to act as 
checks, the federal government. 
But in practice the SDWA regime does not operate at all like that, 
even though there are of course some federal, state, and local officials 
who work hard to safeguard the quality of drinking water and real 
improvements have been made in many localities.  In actuality, to 
lesser or greater degrees in different parts of the Unites States, the 
SDWA regime resembles a collective abdication, rather than a 
cooperation, regime.23  The federal government abdicates its 
																																																																																																																																
 20. ERIK OLSON & KRISTI PULLEN FEDINICK, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE 
COUNCIL, WHAT’S IN YOUR WATER? FLINT AND BEYOND 13 (2016) [hereinafter 
NRDC Report]; TIEMANN, supra note 13, at 7. 
 21. For an example of the EPA threatening to exercise that right, see generally 
Lillian Reed, State Could Lose Authority to Monitor Drinking Water, EVENING SUN 
(Feb. 20, 2017, 1:50 PM), http://www.eveningsun.com/story/news/2017/02/17/state-
could-lose-authority-monitor-drinking-water/97596042/ [https://perma.cc/2QP5-
PWUU]. 
 22. See generally William Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (2005) (explicating the argument for redundant 
enforcement authorities).  The flip side of redundancy, arguably, is a lack of 
accountability, as each level or source of government can blame another for 
unpopular action or inaction. See David A. Dana, The Case for Unfunded Federal 
Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995) (explaining the nonaccountability critique of 
blurring the roles of different levels of government, but also noting that “there is 
evidence that some voters do not carefully distinguish among federal, state and local 
governments,” but rather vote based on their general levels of satisfaction with 
“government”). 
 23. For an argument that abdication by states of responsibilities to localities is a 
broad phenomenon crossing many areas of federal law, both constitutional and 
statutory, see Weinstein-Tull, supra note 6, at 841 (“Much federal law regulates the 
conduct of states.  States, in turn, delegate many of their federal responsibilities to 
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responsibility for safe drinking water, essentially leaving the states 
and localities on their own.24  The states—or at least some of them—
then abdicate their responsibility for safe drinking water, leaving the 
matter to the localities.  Finally, some localities abdicate their 
responsibility to provide truly safe water to the owners and operators 
of public water systems.  As a result of this three-step abdication, 
some water consumers, especially in poor and rural communities, are 
deprived of something we should all agree they deserve as citizens of 
a comparatively wealthy nation, if not simply as human beings—water 
that is safe to drink.25  Nor has there been effective citizen suit 
litigation to check the abdication by federal, state, and local actors.26  
Thus, as shown in Figure 1, the SDWA regime radically departs from 
the ideal-type of cooperative federalism. 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																																																																																																
local governments.  This Article argues that states do more than delegate those 
responsibilities; they abdicate them.  They do not monitor local compliance with 
those laws, they disclaim responsibility for the actions of their local governments, and 
they relinquish the legal capacity to bring their local governments into compliance.”).  
Weinstein-Tull is addressing contexts where the law is reasonably clear that states 
have primary obligations under federal constitutional or statutory law but 
nonetheless lean heavily on the argument that localities should be the subject of any 
litigation brought by advocacy groups or aggrieved citizens.  In the SDWA context, 
however, states (at least arguably) lack any primary legal obligations under federal 
law, so the abdication problem is not one merely of rhetoric and political argument, 
but rather is a problem in the law itself. See id. 
 24. To be fair to the EPA, it repeatedly has threatened states with removal of 
their primacy under SDWA, but the threats are just that, as the EPA currently lacks 
the resources to fulfill the role of the states as enforcers and regulators, however 
inadequate some states are in these roles. See, e.g., David E. Hess, DEP Lacks 
Resources to Enforce Minimum Federal Safe Drinking Water Regulations, PA. 
ENVTL. DIG. BLOG (Jan. 31, 2017, 6:16 AM), http://paenvironmentdaily.blogspot.com/
2017/01/epa-dep-lacks-resources-to-enforce.html [https://perma.cc/8GN8-657A] 
(highlighting repeated empty threats from the EPA and the corresponding 
inadequacy of the state agency’s ability to remedy problems). But see, e.g., Press 
Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Awards $100 Million to Michigan for Flint 
Water Infrastructure Upgrades (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/
newsreleases/epa-awards-100-million-michigan-flint-water-infrastructure-upgrades 
[https://perma.cc/FB33-ELM2] (showing scenario in which funding was provided by 
federal agency to assist state agency in regulatory capacity).  
 25. See generally Warren, supra note 1, at 51–70 (documenting failures of SDWA 
regime). 
 26. See infra Part V. 
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Figure 1. Expectations of Cooperative Federalism and the 
Corresponding Realities of Abdication 
Cooperative Federalism The Abdication Trap 
Effective federal oversight of states 
as regulators and localities as 
regulated entities 
Federal abdication to states 
Effective state oversight of localities 
as regulated entities 
State abdication to localities 
Localities as compliant regulated 
entities 
Localities’ failure to comply with 
regulation 
NGOs/citizen groups checking 
federal, state, and/or local failures 
NGOs unable to check failures 
 
There is abundant evidence of abdication at all levels.  Indeed, no 
one seems to contest the proposition that, at least as regards lead in 
water, the legal regime fails to fulfill its theoretical promise.  One 
starting point for unpacking the pattern of abdication is the EPA’s 
1991 Lead and Copper Rule (“LCR”), which was intended to 
prescribe testing for and responses to lead in drinking water in 
approximately 68,000 public water systems nationwide.27  From the 
outset, however, the LCR has been criticized as setting too low an 
action level for lead in water; for providing for too little and too 
infrequent testing for lead; for leaving too much discretion to local 
water authorities as to how, when, and where to test for lead; and for 
leaving too much discretion to authorities regarding corrosion control 
treatment.28  Despite twenty-five years of intensive criticisms and 
near universal agreement among public health experts that the LCR 
is inadequate, the EPA has been unable to enact a stronger version of 
the LCR.29  The EPA itself has recognized the many flaws of the 
LCR, and has agreed that there is a need for “clear and robust revised 
sampling requirements, strengthened reporting, [and] transparency 
																																																																																																																																
 27. See NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 12. 
 28. See generally Brady Dennis, The EPA’s Lead-in-Water Rule Has Been 
Faulted for Decades. Will Flint Hasten a Change?, WASH. POST (May 5, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/epas-lead-in-water-rule-has-
been-faulted-for-decades-will-flint-hasten-a-change/2016/05/04/8d25bb12-0de9-11e6-
bfa1-4efa856caf2a_story.html?utm_term=.7604819be849 [https://perma.cc/4Y29-
U5LH] (summarizing these criticisms and tracing the history of the Rule); see also 
NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 12–13 (discussing failures in the Rule and 
recommending reforms). 
 29. See Dennis, supra note 28 at 1, 3. 
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provisions that ensure consumers have rapid access to relevant 
information and public education materials.”30 
A recent report on lead in water by the Natural Resources Defense 
Council (“NRDC”) documents that, even within the terms of the 
LCR, there is gross non-enforcement.31  As the NRDC explains, 
based on the EPA’s own violations and enforcement database, “in 
2015, over 18 million people were served by 5,363 community water 
systems that violated the Lead and Copper Rule,” including failures 
to test for lead.32  In 2015, too, “1,110 community water systems 
serving 3.9 million people showed lead levels in excess of 15 parts per 
billion (ppb)”—the federal action level—“in at least 10 percent of the 
homes tested.”33  The geographic scope of LCR violations and lead 
level exceedances is “extraordinary.”34 
Moreover, the EPA database very substantially understates the 
problem; as the NRDC explains, “NRDC has documented 
underreporting problems in the EPA’s drinking water database for 25 
years,” and “the EPA itself admits that ‘audits and assessments have 
shown that violation data are substantially incomplete.’”35  Even 
those violations that are documented are rarely subject to formal or 
informal enforcement actions, leading the NRDC to conclude that 
there is a “lack of accountability [that] sends a clear message to water 
suppliers that knowingly violate the Lead and Copper Rule, with state 
and federal complicity: [t]here is no cop on the beat.”36 
A USA Today investigative report, also drawing on the EPA’s 
database, identifies almost 2000 water systems spanning all fifty states 
where testing has shown excessive levels of lead contamination over 
																																																																																																																																
 30. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, LEAD AND COPPER RULE REVISIONS WHITE 
PAPER 4 (2016) [hereinafter EPA WHITE PAPER].  Whether the EPA under the 
Trump Administration will continue to call for revisions to the LCR, however, is not 
yet clear. But cf. Mae Wu, How Trump’s Budget Drains Drinking Water Protections, 
NRDC: EXPERT BLOG (June 19, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/how-trumps-
budget-drains-drinking-water-protections [https://perma.cc/H6Z2-5WHD] (noting 
statements made by the administration and the current funding and policy priorities). 
 31. See NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 12–15. 
 32. Id. at 5. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (quoting U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE 
ASSURANCE, NATIONAL PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS COMPLIANCE REPORT 3 (2013), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/sdwacom2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T9CE-R34R]). 
 36. NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 6. 
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the past four years.37  The water systems, which reported lead levels 
exceeding EPA standards, collectively supply water to 6 million 
people.38  The investigation also found that at least 180 of these water 
systems failed to notify consumers about the high lead levels, as 
federal rules require.39  It bears noting that the USA Today reporting, 
like the NRDC report, is based on the EPA’s database of violations, 
but we know that localities sometimes do not test for compliance or 
report violations to the states, and states sometimes do not report to 
the EPA.40  Indeed, as of June 2016, two years after the complaints of 
contamination began, the State of Michigan still had not officially 
reported to the EPA that Flint was in violation of the LCR.41 
Experts agree that local water authorities have many tools 
available to them to avoid effective testing.  “[I]f [the utility] want[s] 
to be clever, [it] can test when [it is] pretty sure there’s not a problem 
and not find a problem.”42  The result is that the existing sampling 
protocol, even when it is nominally followed, can miss “high lead 
levels and potential human exposure.”43  The methods used to avoid 
adequate testing are various, including intentionally testing at sites 
where lead contamination is least likely and running water or flushing 
toilets before testing.44  In many small water authorities that often 
																																																																																																																																
 37. Alison Young & Mark Nichols, Beyond Flint: Excessive Levels Found in 
Almost 2000 Water Systems Across All 50 States, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2016), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/03/11/nearly-2000-water-systems-fail-lead-
tests/81220466/ [https://perma.cc/9AHW-BV54]. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 14; Warren, supra note 1, at 68. 
 41. NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 7. 
 42. Dennis, supra note 28 (quoting Erik Olson of NRDC); see also Garrett 
Ellison, Why Michigan Lead Reforms Don’t Call for Even Lower Action Level, 
MLIVE (Apr. 22, 2016, 10:08 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/04/
michigan_lead_10ppb.html [https://perma.cc/UB4L-ZCDQ] (quoting Virginia Tech’s 
Marc Edwards, to the effect that the EPA rule “has been diluted by . . . loopholes and 
utilities which ‘cheat’ and sample in a way that avoids” finding a violation of the 
federal standard).  As Edwards explains, “[y]ou can focus on a number, but as we saw 
in Flint, the number is meaningless if you’re not sampling in the right places.” Id. 
 43. See Dennis, supra note 28 (quoting Tom Neltner of Environmental Defense). 
 44. The EPA addressed these various “cheating” methods in a recent 
memorandum. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Ground Water & Drinking 
Water, Memorandum on Clarification of Recommended Tap Sampling Procedures 
(Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/
epa_lcr_sampling_memorandum_dated_february_29_2016_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/
H9N4-BKWB]. 
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lack anything like the staff or expertise to do testing, there is not even 
a pretense of undertaking testing.45 
The pattern of abdication is also evident in federal and state 
funding for localities seeking to upgrade infrastructure in order to 
improve water quality—or, to be more precise, the gross inadequacy 
of such funding.  The text of the SDWA could be read to suggest that 
the federal government will bear seventy-five percent of the cost of all 
necessary infrastructure for clean water, with the states making up the 
difference.46  But Congressional appropriations have, in fact, never 
been anything close to meeting that target for funding to the states.47  
																																																																																																																																
 45. As a USA Today investigative report showed, the federal and the state 
governments de facto allow very small local water authorities to ignore the SDWA 
altogether, apparently out of a recognition that these authorities simply lack the 
capacity to do much of anything. See Laura Ungar & Mark Nichols, 4 Million 
Americans Could Be Drinking Toxic Water and Never Know, USA TODAY 
(Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/12/13/broken-system-
means-millions-of-rural-americans-exposed-to-poisoned-or-untested-water/94071732/ 
[https://perma.cc/W7HZ-2BPX] (reporting that “[s]ome 4 million Americans get 
water from small operators who skipped required tests or did not conduct the tests 
properly, violating a cornerstone of federal safe drinking water laws.  The testing is 
required because, without it, utilities, regulators and people drinking the water can’t 
know if it’s safe.  In more than 2,000 communities, lead tests were skipped more than 
once.  Hundreds repeatedly failed to properly test for five or more years.”).  It bears 
noting that the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development also has 
abdicated responsibility for lead in water as it affects federally-funded housing, 
claiming that any responsibility rests with the EPA. See generally Emily A. Benfer, 
Contaminated Childhood: The Chronic Lead Poisoning of Low-Income Children and 
Communities of Color in Federally Assisted Housing, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 493 
(2017). 
 46. See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42467, LEGISLATIVE 
OPTIONS FOR FINANCING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE 3 (2016).  Even with the Trump 
Administration’s emphasis on infrastructure, it is clear that this interpretation of the 
SDWA will not find traction anytime soon. See Press Release, The White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Works to 
Rebuild America’s Infrastructure (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2017/08/15/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-works-rebuild-americas 
[https://perma.cc/QY22-ETLZ] (“Government will get out of the way to allow state 
and local governments to succeed at meeting their unique challenges.  Only 1/5 of 
infrastructure spending comes from the Federal Government, the vast majority 
comes from the states, localities, and the private sector.”) 
 47. COPELAND, supra note 46, at 5–6; Warren, supra note 1, at 67–68; see also 
DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 126 (2d ed. 2004).  
With the passage of the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act 
(“WIFIA”) in 2014, Congress authorized the creation of the WIFIA program, which 
was intended to support water infrastructure projects through financing of loans, but 
Congress did not appropriate funding to the EPA for these loans until December of 
2016. See Paul Epstein, Water Act a “WIIN” for Infrastructure, SHEARMAN & 
STERLING, LLP (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.shearman.com/en/newsinsights/
publications/2017/01/water-act-a-wiin-for-infrastructure [https://perma.cc/U6UU-
MWD8].  With appropriations since December 2016 granting the WIFIA program 
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Neither the federal government nor (generally) the states have 
provided localities with anything like the funding they would need to 
address problems of lead contamination.48 
II.  WHY DO WE OBSERVE ABDICATION? 
Why do local water authorities fail to properly test for lead in 
drinking water, and even when they do test, why do they fail to report 
test results and take appropriate remedial action?  At the local level, 
economies of scale are sometimes a problem, because some water 
authorities are so small it is not reasonable to believe that they will 
ever have the staff and sophistication to assess and address problems 
of lead in their water.49  But for all local water authorities, there are 
strong incentives not to learn about problems with lead in their water.  
Simply testing for lead can cause concern among water users, who 
otherwise might not ever know to raise the issue of lead in water.50  
Moreover, testing for lead can result in demands that the problem of 
lead be remediated, which can be very expensive—so expensive that 
																																																																																																																																
$25 million in budget authority, the EPA invites eligible entities to apply for “$2.3 
billion in WIFIA loans to help finance $5.1 billion in water infrastructure investments.” 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, How to Apply for WIFIA Assistance: Notice of 
Funding Availability, https://www.epa.gov/wifia/how-apply-wifia-assistance#notice 
[https://perma.cc/AG8W-VTP5].  This amount, however, will not put a dent in the 
expected cost of necessary water infrastructure projects. See infra notes 58–65 and 
accompanying text.  
 48. See COPELAND, supra note 46, at 5 (“Perhaps the most critical concern is the 
fact that federal capitalization grants [for water quality projects] are entirely subject 
to appropriations, which generally have been flat or declining for more than a 
decade . . . .”); NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 21 (“Current congressional funding 
of $2.37 billion per year for water infrastructure falls far short of the enormous need. 
This investment must be substantially increased, to at least the approximately $8 
billion per year stipulated by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009.”).  The budget proposed by President Trump would entail no increase in 
annual funding to states to improve water infrastructure, and it calls for a reduction 
in funds for federal oversight. See generally Sarah Frostenson, Trump’s Budget 
Cripples the EPA’s Ability to Keep Drinking Water Safe, VOX (Mar. 17, 2017), 
http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/3/16/14640972/budget-epa-enforcement-
bad-drinking-water-trump [https://perma.cc/S5EH-6SJP]. 
 49. For an extended discussion of the great difficulties of small water authorities 
in meaningfully complying with federal and state drinking water regulations, see 
SCHEBERLE, supra note 47, at 124–53.  As Scheberle explains, an unquestionable 
problem with SDWA is that it seeks to apply the same regulatory regime to water 
authorities that vary dramatically in size. Id. at 136–38.  The EPA has taken some 
actions to encourage very small local water authorities to consolidate, but the agency 
plainly has no authority to require that. 
 50. See Dennis, supra note 28 (quoting one Illinois water-operations manager as 
stating “[w]hen you do extensive sampling like this, you have to explain why, when in 
fact there might not be any problem . . . . No one wants to hide anything from 
anyone, but the PR factor is something that has to be dealt with.”). 
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imposing the costs of remediation on water users might seem 
practically impossible and, at best, extremely problematic.51  The local 
governments, of which local water authorities are a part or with which 
they are affiliated, have budgets that are already exhausted through 
the meeting of basic needs like police and schools. In financially 
strapped localities, there are no additional funds available for a 
response to any identified water quality problems that would not also 
mean politically problematic reductions in other, extant funding.  
Thus, it is simply better for local authorities not to know. 
Most managers of local water authorities—most local officials—
presumably do not want to think of themselves as responsible for 
exposing people to lead poisoning in the communities for which they 
work.  Given the strong incentives of local water authorities to 
believe that their water is safe, it is unsurprising that they can also 
believe that avoiding testing (or avoiding accurate testing) is simply a 
pragmatic, harmless way to avoid needless entanglements with 
uncomprehending customers and officious state and federal 
bureaucrats.52 
One possible way to understand abdication at the federal and state 
levels is as reflecting a normative view on the part of state leaders that 
local water quality is simply an issue for localities, as well as a 
normative view on the part of federal leaders that local water quality 
is an issue for the states and localities.  These “it’s-a-state” or “it’s-a-
local” problem views runs contrary to the text of the SDWA: the 
SDWA is an incomprehensible statute if, in fact, drinking water 
quality is not a subject of federal or national concern.  So, too, state 
drinking water statutes and regulations are incomprehensible if 
drinking water is solely a matter of local concern.  Nonetheless, these 
views that “it’s-a-state” or “it’s-a-local” problem do have some 
traction in political discourse, and may have some sway in the federal 
																																																																																																																																
 51. See id. (highlighting a statement from Tom Neltner of Environmental 
Defense Fund that “[u]tilities have no incentive to find the problem.  That’s not a 
good rule”); see also Malcom Duncan & Aja Brown, Opinion, Commentary: Flint 
Shows the Need for Innovative City-State Partnerships, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN 
(Mar. 15, 2016, 12:00 AM), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/opinion/commentary-
flint-shows-need-for-innovative-city-state-partnerships/ouNGQlwdCCQytUGtesPI9
O/ [https://perma.cc/DE34-ZC9A] (explaining that poorer cities like Waco, Compton, 
and Flint realistically need state assistance and partnership to address public health 
and other problems they face). 
 52. See SCHEBERLE, supra note 47, at 140–47 (reporting the views of state water 
agency officials regarding the EPA).  Scheberle’s interviews of water managers 
suggest that they believe that they are doing a fully adequate job protecting public 
health, but that federal bureaucrats simply focus on non-existent problems and/or do 
not understand how water systems work in practice. See id. 
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or state political process.  For example, these views were expressed by 
some in Congress in explaining their opposition to additional funding 
for Flint.53  At the same time, even if one believes that basic human 
health and welfare are not a national concern, but rather something 
that should be left to the state and locality where any particular 
American lives, the social costs of lead poisoning do not stop at the 
boundaries of localities or states.54  Moreover, a belief in a limited 
role for the federal government or state government does not explain 
why federal and state abdication appears to be more marked in the 
context of lead in drinking water quality than in some other contexts. 
Another possible normative force behind abdication could be the 
view that public service lines made of lead are connected to private 
service lines made of lead.55  To solve the problem of lead 
contamination, both public and private lead service lines need to be 
replaced.  Further, partial replacement (of public lines only) could be 
even worse than no replacement, depending on how carefully the 
partial replacement is undertaken.56  There is a real issue as to how 
																																																																																																																																
 53. See, e.g., Phillip Wegman, Here’s Why Mike Lee Opposes Federal Aid For 
Flint, DAILY SIGNAL (Mar. 7, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/03/07/heres-why-
mike-lee-opposes-federal-aid-for-flint/ [https://perma.cc/9ZVM-HJE5]; Press 
Release, Heritage Found., Senate WRDA Bill Creates New Programs, Lacks 
Reforms (Sept. 7, 2016), http://heritageaction.com/press-releases/senate-wrda-bill-
creates-new-programs-lacks-reforms-s2848/ [https://perma.cc/5CHB-M3LZ] 
(claiming that drinking water issues are “best handled by state and local 
institutions”); see also CATO INST., CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS 184 (1995) 
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/
1995/9/104-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LXC-VNUC] (“Federal ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
regulations not only impose unnecessary costs on providers of drinking water; they 
also force localities to devote resources to minor problems, which leaves fewer 
resources for major ones.  Localities, not Washington, should determine their own 
standards and how to meet them.”). But see WIIN Act, 114 Bill Tracking S. 612, 
LEXISNEXIS (Jan. 25, 2017) (showing ultimate passage in the House of 
Representatives, 360-61, and in the Senate, 78-21). 
 54. See NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 3, 11; Peter Muennig, The Social Costs 
of Childhood Lead Exposure in the Post–Lead Regulation Era, 163 ARCHIVES 
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 844, 844 (2009) (“Reducing blood lead levels to 
less than 1 g/dL among all US children between birth and age 6 years would reduce 
crime and increase on-time high school graduation rates later in life.  The net societal 
benefits arising from these improvements in high school graduation rates and 
reductions in crime would amount to $50,000 . . . per child annually[.]”) 
 55. EPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 9. 
 56. See Darryl Fears & Brady Dennis, One City’s Solution to Drinking Water 
Contamination? Get Rid of Every Lead Pipe, WASH. POST (May 10, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/one-citys-solution-to-
drinking-water-contamination-get-rid-of-every-lead-pipe/2016/05/10/480cd842-0814-
11e6-bdcb-0133da18418d_story.html?utm_term=.01224541d9c7 [https://perma.cc/
ZDS4-R8T3]; see also Michael Hawthorne & Peter Matuszak, As Other Cities Dig 
Up Pipes Made of Toxic Lead, Chicago Resists, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 21, 2016, 7:12 AM), 
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best to divide financial responsibility for infrastructure upgrades 
between public and private actors, and how to deal with the problem 
of private owners who simply lack the funds to finance private line 
replacement.57 
This private property problem, however, cannot plausibly justify 
federal, state, and local abdication as to testing and disclosure, which 
would at least allow private owners to know if they have exposure to 
lead contamination.  Moreover, there is a strong argument that the 
dividing line between public and private service lines is largely 
arbitrary and should not dictate the scope of public responsibilities.58  
And many residents, such as renters and the children and guests of 
owners, may not even own the residences to which private lead 
service lines run.59  As a normative matter, too, it is not clear why 
even adult owners, who are less at risk of being harmed from lead 
exposure, should be subject to the risk of lead poisoning simply 
because they cannot readily afford to replace private service lines.60 
Federal and state abdication as to drinking water testing and 
treatment, then, does not seem to be readily explicable by normative 
conceptions regarding the proper boundaries between federal, state, 
and local governments, or between the public and the private sectors.  
Rather, federal and state abdication seems most explicable by raw 
																																																																																																																																
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-lead-water-pipes-funding-
20160921-story.html [https://perma.cc/FAK3-JLU9]. 
 57. See EPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 9. 
 58. Indeed, some members of an advisory group to the EPA have suggested that 
the EPA revise its rules to require a local water authority to replace both publicly 
and privately owned portions of water lines that are under effective control of the 
water authority. See LEAD & COPPER RULE WORKING GROUP, FINAL REPORT OF 
THE LEAD & COPPER RULE WORKING GROUP TO THE NATIONAL DRINKING WATER 
ADVISORY COUNCIL 18 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-
01/documents/ndwaclcrwgfinalreportaug2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BV9-BZWV]. 
 59. States have only recently begun to make available information to residents 
regarding whether pipes leading to their homes contain lead. See generally Grading 
the Nation: Interactive Map, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/health/grading-
nation-lead-pipe-disclosure-polices-map [https://perma.cc/7THB-PUKM] (grading 
states in terms of how much information they make available). 
 60. The EPA, in fact, has pointed to several cities that have successfully resolved 
the question of public-private responsibility in undertaking service line replacements. 
See EPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 9 (“To the extent water systems rely on 
homeowners to pay for replacement of privately-owned portions of lines, there are 
concerns about consumer’s ability to pay and the possibility that lower-income 
homeowners will be unable to replace lines, resulting in disparate levels of protection.  
However, a number of cities and towns across the nation have successfully 
implemented full LSLR and have developed innovate approaches to addressing these 
challenges, including Lansing, Michigan; Madison, Wisconsin; and more recently, 
Boston, Massachusetts—and EPA is looking at this experience in the context of 
developing proposed revisions to the LCR.”). 
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politics.  That is, to appropriate a sum that would meaningfully 
address lead contamination, politicians would have to expend more 
political capital than would be gained by the ultimate abatement of 
lead in the nation’s water.   
The status quo of underfunding supports the system in which each 
government actor has two choices: point fingers at each other or bury 
its head in the sand.  State officials do not press localities to test and 
report because they know localities will call upon states to pay for 
necessary responses, and most state legislatures have not allocated 
money for such work.61  Federal officials do not press states to 
enforce, or localities to test and comply with testing and reporting 
guidelines because they know that states and localities will call on the 
federal government to pay for the necessary responses, and Congress 
has not allocated the funding for an appropriate response.62  At the 
end of the day, federal and state abdication is a story of money—or 
the absence of it. 
The magnitude of the funding absence is not small.  Lead can leach 
from lead pipes including public service lines and the private service 
lines that connect homes and other buildings to the public lines.63  
The most comprehensive solution to the problem of lead in water 
would be the replacement of all public and private lead service lines, 
combined with special abatement and public health protections in 
place to guard against the contamination that can result during the 
replacement of the lines.64  Short of wholesale replacement, and until 
it is completed, rigorous maintenance of road and sewer 
infrastructure, use of proper corrosion control chemicals in water, and 
public education are needed.  Altogether, solving the problem of lead 
in water could cost upwards of $300 billion dollars.65 
																																																																																																																																
 61. See Warren, supra note 1, at 74–75. 
 62. See id. at 76; see also Guha, supra note 10.  
 63. NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 6; see Lead Pipes: A Threat to Kids Across 
America, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/health/lead-pipes-threat-kids-
across-america [https://perma.cc/FXZ3-CCE6]. 
 64. California has, in fact, at least adopted a goal of full replacement of lead 
service lines, although even there the question remains whether there will be 
sufficient funding. See Tom Neltner, California Requires Replacement of All Lead 
Service Lines—But Vigilance Needed on Implementation, ENVTL. DEF. FUND: 
HEALTH BLOG (Jan. 19, 2017), http://blogs.edf.org/health/2017/01/19/california-
sb1398-on-lsls/ [https://perma.cc/BZ4G-QE2F]. 
 65. Estimates vary as to the costs of lead pipe replacement, but the sum involved 
would seem to be at least $300 billion. See Matthew Dolan, U.S. Could Face a $300B 
Lead Pipe Overhaul, Agency Warns, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Mar. 5, 2016, 6:14 PM), 
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/03/04/flint-
crisis-could-cost-us-300b-lead-pipe-overhaul-agency-warns/81316860/ 
[https://perma.cc/D9G8-K2DG]. 
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Three hundred billion dollars is a great deal of money, but 
Congress and state legislatures could appropriate that amount over 
the period of a number of years to achieve complete lead abatement.  
Although there are many models and abundant scholarship regarding 
the appropriation process, there is no question that it is a highly 
political process.  Legislators and political party leaders, at least in 
part, make the decision to support one funding item over another 
based on the expected political gains and political costs of their 
decisions.66  The pattern of grossly inadequate funding for water 
infrastructure at the federal and state level—a pattern that drives the 
triple abdication—reflects the fact that federal and state legislators do 
not see sufficient political gain in pushing for more funding. 
And that political calculation makes sense because lead 
contamination in water, generally, does not seem to be a politically 
salient issue.  It is not an issue that drives people to organize, march, 
donate money or, most importantly, vote.  Before Flint, and aside 
from Flint, lead in water does not make the news, with few 
exceptions.67  It is not invoked at party conventions.68  It is not the 
stuff of large protests and letter-writing campaigns.69  Lead 
																																																																																																																																
 66. See generally D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, Congressional 
Appropriations and the Electoral Connection, 47 J. POL. 59 (1985) (testing and 
supporting an instrumentalist view of legislative votes regarding funding).  For 
further background discussion on the underlying theory and the corresponding 
implications of cognitive psychology, see Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some 
Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 
748–49 (1990) (“We seek to identify how, in a democratic society, public attitudes 
about risk might influence the kinds of risk regulation programs that will be enacted, 
given that political officials, in their quest for electoral security, seek to satisfy the 
preferences of constituents. . . . We choose to proceed on the assumption that while 
cognitive theory accurately describes how citizens make decisions about risks to life 
and health, traditional decision theory can be aptly applied to the political actor’s 
problem of calculating the best response to citizen demands for action.”).  
 67. Pre-Flint, however, there was a steady stream of scientific, non-popular press 
articles exploring harms from lead and possible solutions and their costs. See 
generally Rebecca Renner, Reaction to the Solution: Lead Exposure Following 
Partial Service Line Replacement, 118 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A202 (2010) 
(exploring whether partial replacement of lead service lines was a viable solution). 
 68. The Flint crisis did prompt the Democratic Party to address water 
infrastructure in its 2016 platform, but the Republican platform continued to ignore 
the issue. See Andrew Farr, GOP, Democratic Platforms Present Contrasting Visions 
for Infrastructure, WATER FIN. & MGMT. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://waterfm.com/gop-
democratic-platforms-present-contrasting-visions-infrastructure/ 
[https://perma.cc/3BU9-AAVZ]. 
 69. One exception is the protest following a 2004 Washington Post article 
regarding the risk from lead in water. See Joseph Foti, Lead in Our Water—A 
Washington, D.C. Mystery, WORLD RESOURCES INST.: INSIGHTS BLOG 
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contamination has not even been prominent in academic discourse of 
environmental justice.70 
But why is there not political agitation around—and corresponding 
demand for political action to address—the problem of lead in water?  
There are at least two plausible reasons.  First, the lack of political 
capital targeting the issue of lead in water may reflect, in part, the 
issue’s availability and its effect on voters’ predictions that they will 
suffer from lead contamination in their water supply.  Lead in water is 
invisible and tasteless.71  Its effects may go unnoticed, and even when 
people do notice the effects, they may not attribute them to lead 
contamination.  The water in Flint attracted residents’ attention not 
because of lead, per se, but because of other contaminants that made 
the water brown and may have caused rashes and other immediate 
effects.72  Moreover, the populations most vulnerable to the effects of 
lead in water—poor, minority, or geographically isolated 
populations—tend to be less capable than other populations of 
garnering attention that translates into political salience, in part 
because of their lack of resources to invest in politics and in part 
because of classism, racism, and other prejudices.73 
																																																																																																																																
(Mar. 21, 2008), http://www.wri.org/blog/2008/03/lead-our-water-washington-dc-
mystery [https://perma.cc/C87M-RJE5]. 
 70. For example, I could not locate any article in the Westlaw secondary journals 
database addressing the Federal Lead and Copper Rule as a problem of 
“environmental justice” prior to 2016.  The most prominent environmental justice 
articles in the legal scholarship have focused on the siting of polluting facilities or 
waste disposal facilities in low-income, minority neighborhoods. See generally Vicki 
Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of 
Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993).  Such facilities, 
unlike lead in drinking water, are highly visible to local populations. 
 71. See Young & Nichols, supra note 37. 
 72. See Abby Goodnough et al., When the Water Turned Brown, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/us/when-the-water-turned-
brown.html [https://nyti.ms/2k5axs2] (recounting reactions to brown tap water); see 
also Nives Dolšak & Aseem Prakash, It’s Not Just Flint: Here’s Why We Ignore 
Water Pollution, WASH. POST (June 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/08/flints-contamination-and-victorias-secrets-heres-
why-we-ignore-water-pollution/?utm_term=.f16a0fc43f58 [https://perma.cc/UA24-
DEUW] (“Of course, water is key to human existence.  But one important insight is 
that water pollution is not visible and therefore is overlooked.  Citizens tend to focus 
on problems they can see and experience.”). 
 73. See Dolšak & Prakash, supra note 72 (“If you are disadvantaged and face 
pollution problems, you are in jeopardy twice over, as the vast literature on 
environmental justice makes clear.  The Flint contamination problem in part reflects 
income and racial disparities; city and state-level officials didn’t have the incentives to 
respond sufficiently to complaints about water quality.  This is a visibility issue, too — 
people may be invisible as well as problems.”); see also EPA WHITE PAPER, supra 
note 30, at 17; NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 16–17. 
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Flint is exceptional in how politically salient it made the problem of 
lead in drinking water.  There may be localities around the country 
with lead levels in water comparable to Flint’s (until recently) 
extremely high levels.  We know there are many localities with far too 
much lead in their drinking water.74  But several aspects of the Flint 
story made it exceptionally gripping for the media: the state’s unusual 
role under emergency powers;75 how Flint’s water became 
contaminated despite the traditional use of, and close proximity to, a 
completely safe water source;76 the grotesque incompetence of the 
water managers who ignored the need for corrosion control, and 
egregious lying on the part of government officials;77 the heroism of a 
local pediatrician in insisting that children were being poisoned;78 and 
the state’s intransigence, dismissiveness, and callousness even after 
the problem had come to light.79  Flint garnered media attention of a 
sort that one cannot imagine other localities receiving.  And thanks in 
large part to this media attention, Flint has led to some political 
mobilization to address lead contamination in Michigan and 
elsewhere.80  But we cannot expect (and would not want) there to be 
more stories like Flint to keep pressure up for action on lead.  As the 
press turns away from Flint, and time passes, the Flint effect on the 
politics of lead is likely to dissipate. 
																																																																																																																																
 74. See NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 5 (“Flint is not alone: over 18 million 
people were served by systems violating the Lead and Copper Rule in 2015.”). 
 75. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 39–42 (explaining the role of the 
state’s emergency powers). 
 76. See Warren, supra note 1, at 77–78 (“For most, the shift to the Flint River was 
obviously ill advised before it occurred in April 2014.”). 
 77. This conduct has given rise to criminal indictments. See Paul Egan & Elisha 
Anderson, 5 Michigan Officials Face Manslaughter Charges Over Flint Water Crisis, 
USA TODAY (June 14, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/
06/14/flint-michigan-prosecutions/396195001/ [https://perma.cc/U2SM-Y7ZP]; see 
also NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 4. 
 78. See NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 10; Sanjay Gupta et al., ‘Our Mouths 
Were Ajar’: Doctor’s Fight to Expose Flint’s Water Crisis, CNN (Jan. 22, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/21/health/flint-water-mona-hanna-attish/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZN67-MG36]. 
 79. Indeed, it has been argued that the outrageousness of the Flint story is its 
distinctive and legally salient feature. See Toni Massaro & Ellen Brooks, Flint of 
Outrage, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
 80. See infra text accompanying notes 114–18 (discussing state reforms in the 
wake of Flint); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing federal 
legislative action). 
1348 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
III.  THE RELATIONSHIP (OR LACK THEREOF) BETWEEN 
INFORMATION, POLITICAL MOBILIZATION, AND LAW 
As Luke Cole argued years ago during the first wave of 
environmental justice literature, the project of achieving 
environmental justice requires more than talk, and more than law on 
the books.  It requires political mobilization and political pressure.81  
Even if we had much better federal regulations and even if the EPA’s 
famously inadequate LCR was finally revised after years of talk about 
such a revision, there would still need to be the political will to 
support real enforcement and remediation of the problem.  Hence, 
the question that deserves attention, but cannot so readily be 
answered is: how can the problem of lead in water be made and kept 
more politically salient, such that there would be the political will for 
sustained action? 
Better, more readily accessible, and more vivid information about 
who is exposed to lead in water would make the problem of lead 
more salient to those affected and could help foster and sustain 
political mobilization to address reducing lead exposures through 
government-funded infrastructure projects and other initiatives.82  
But to get better testing and more effective disclosure, there needs to 
be some political will in the first place to institute and enforce laws 
requiring better testing and more effective disclosure.  For those 
concerned about the problem of lead in water, legal reform aimed at 
testing and disclosure may be more politically feasible than reform 
aimed at expensive, wholesale replacement of lead service lines.  And 
the former kind of legal reform, in turn, ultimately may make it 
politically feasible to secure government funding for the latter (much 
more expensive) kind of reform. 
The goal, then, is to create a kind of feedback loop on the way to 
full resolution of the problem of lead in water.  Political mobilization, 
perhaps spurred by Flint, allows for reforms in law that result in the 
production of better information, which produces more political 
mobilization, which reinforces and even extends legal reform, which 
produces even better information, which produces more political 
																																																																																																																																
 81. See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: 
The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L. Q. 619, 648 (1992); Luke 
W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s Sling, 
21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 541 (1994). See generally Noll & Krier, supra note 66, at 
767–68. 
 82. And, even if that was not successful, better information would at least allow 
families to take self-protective measures such as running taps or buying and using 
filters. 
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mobilization, which ultimately becomes powerful enough to deliver 
the funding necessary for the infrastructure changes that are needed 
to safeguard public health.  Admittedly this scenario is theoretical, 
but this is a moment when, broadly speaking, legal reform regarding 
issues of lead in water seems plausible, as evidenced by Governor 
Snyder’s proposed new drinking water regulations in Michigan and 
the recent passage of legislation in Ohio, Illinois, and California.83  
The question then, is: what shape should this reform take? 
IV.  LEGAL REFORM AS INSTITUTIONAL RE-DESIGN: MOVING 
AWAY FROM COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 
Whatever the substance of testing and disclosure rules for lead 
should be, rules only matter if they are enforced, and we have seen a 
pattern of non-enforcement of the rules we already have.  In the 
current regulatory regime, there are two sets of regulators and 
enforcers (the federal and state governments) and one set of 
regulated entities that are legally responsible for testing for and 
disclosing the presence of lead, and for treating drinking water if 
there is a violation (localities or local water authorities).  The regime 
should be re-designed to expand the role of the federal government 
or state governments to make them primarily liable as regulated 
entities with respect to drinking water, as opposed to simply being 
regulators and enforcers.  The expansion of legal responsibility could 
be total in theory, covering both testing, disclosure and treatment, or 
partial, covering only testing and disclosure.  Since the role of 
localities is crucial for testing and treatment, the question then is 
whether the federal government or state governments should share 
that responsibility as co-legally-responsible actors, not whether sole 
responsibility should vest in the federal or state governments.  
Figure 2 shows some options for institutional re-design. 
 
																																																																																																																																
 83. See Jim Lynch & Michael Gerstein, Snyder Plans Renewed Push for Stricter 
Lead Limit, DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 13, 2017, 12:07 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/
story/news/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2017/02/13/snyder-plans-renewed-push-stricter-
lead-water-limit/97828670/ [https://perma.cc/7BCU-9LN5]; James F. McCarty, New 
Ohio Law Requires Mapping of Lead Pipes, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Oct. 12, 
2016), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016/10/new_ohio_law_requires_
mapping.html [https://perma.cc/58YR-GQFL]; Tom Neltner, California Requires 
Replacement of All Lead Service Lines—but Vigilance Needed on Implementation, 
ENVTL. DEF. FUND: HEALTH BLOG (Jan. 19, 2017), http://blogs.edf.org/health/
2017/01/19/california-sb1398-on-lsls/ [https://perma.cc/6HXM-TKMU]; Sophia 
Tareen, Rauner Signs Lead Testing Law for Schools, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 16, 2017, 8:30 
PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-rauner-school-lead-testing-law-201701
16-story.html [http://perma.cc/9U6K-W6WP]. 
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Figure 2. Legal Responsibility of Government Entities for 
Implementation in Institutional Re-Design 
Government 
Entity 
SDWA Regime “Radical Shift” 
Design 
“Moderate Shift” 
Design 
FEDERAL Oversight Oversight Oversight 
STATE Oversight Fully shared/joint 
with local 
Shared/joint with 
local in testing and 
disclosure 
LOCAL Sole responsibility Fully shared with 
state 
Shared/joint with 
state in testing and 
disclosure 
NGO/CITIZEN 
GROUP 
Suits against local Suits against state 
and local 
Suits against state 
and local 
 
In theory, one could imagine a federal law that made the federal 
government directly responsible for testing for lead and disclosing 
risks at the local level, and perhaps even for treatment.84  But any 
proposal for such a statute would be greeted with claims that it 
represents a heavy-handed approach to a realm traditionally left to 
state and local governments.  And, politics aside, direct testing for 
lead by the federal government may not be the most efficient 
approach, given the geographic distance between the federal 
government and the tens of thousands of localities where testing 
needs to be done. 
A more plausible approach would be changes at the state level, as a 
matter of state law, whereby states legally assume responsibility, 
jointly with local water authorities, for drinking water testing and 
disclosure (in the moderate shift alternative set forth in Figure 2) or 
for drinking water testing, disclosure, and treatment (in the radical 
shift alternative in Figure 2).  State legislatures would certainly flinch 
at the radical option for budgetary reasons alone, so in the current 
political climate the moderate shift is the most conceivable option. 
One might ask, why would we expect state employees tasked with 
testing for lead in water to act with any greater fidelity to the law than 
local water authority employees?  One reason is that localities have 
an even more immediate incentive to engage in avoidance than states 
do, as localities are currently the only entities legally responsible for 
																																																																																																																																
 84. See generally David A. Dana & Deborah Turkheimer, After Flint: 
Environmental Justice as Equal Protection, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 93 (2017) (suggesting 
that there are possibilities for addressing problems like Flint under the broad 
conceptual rubric of federal Equal Protection). 
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addressing the problem—and they are, in theory at least, legally 
responsible for addressing the problem regardless of whether they can 
obtain federal or state funding.85  Moreover, criticism from consumers 
as a result of any identified problem will be directed immediately at 
the local water authority and at the state only secondarily, if at all.86 
In addition, making states legally liable for testing and disclosure 
may change the psychology of state legislatures to some degree.  State 
legislators may feel that, given their legal responsibility, they must at 
least appropriate adequate funds for testing and disclosure.  Legal 
liability for testing also may change the psychology of state water or 
environmental agencies.  The bureaucracies might feel more 
empowered, to the extent they were already inclined to act, to address 
possible lead problems, because state legal responsibility for testing 
and disclosure would provide them some measure of rhetorical 
protection against claims by local actors that they were being 
overbearing or unduly intrusive.  Even for state bureaucracies that 
are otherwise disinclined to address problems of lead in water, the 
possibility that they will be criticized publicly for failing to meet not 
only a regulatory oversight duty, but also a substantive legal duty to 
engage in testing and disclosure, might be enough to motivate them to 
devote resources to verifying representations by local water 
authorities regarding testing and disclosure, and to step in when local 
water authorities have not met applicable requirements. 
This shift to shared responsibility by the state could be configured 
in a variety of ways to fit the political, economic, and physical 
circumstances in each state.  The obligation by the state could be to 
test and disclose for all water authorities, to do so only for small and 
low-income localities where the risk of inadequate testing seems 
highest, or to audit local testing and disclosure practices, report the 
audit results, and then test in localities where audits showed local 
noncompliance. 
In this reconfigured regime, local authorities still would be legally 
responsible for, and hence empowered to, test alongside the state, and 
thus would be able to determine if the testing proposed by the state 
																																																																																																																																
 85. Nothing in SDWA’s text preconditions operators’ legal duties on the 
availability of federal or state funding. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-27 
(West 2017). 
 86. For consumers, their direct point of contact regarding drinking water is their 
local water authority and local government.  That is the entity, most notably, that 
sends them water bills and informs them of any issues with water service, such as 
interruptions to service.  It is only natural, therefore, that citizens would tend to voice 
their complaints to their local water authorities and local governments, and to blame 
them for any problems. 
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was inadequate.  Localities could engage in more testing than the 
state on its own would deem adequate.  The story of Flint illustrates 
why such local input is important, because there, the state managed 
Flint’s water under emergency powers in a way that sidelined local 
control and acted with less regard for local welfare than local leaders 
might have had they retained effective control.87  Failure to meet 
legal responsibilities is a risk for both state and local officials, which is 
why making them co-responsible, as a legal matter, is an attractive 
option. 
Cara Cunningham Warren has recently suggested that a more 
collaborative, mutually respectful, more “polyphonic” kind of 
federalism may be what is needed to address the problem of lead in 
water.88  But it is unclear how calls for greater collaboration among 
different levels of government will lessen the problem of triple 
abdication.  Re-configuring legal responsibility to make states co-
liable for testing and disclosure may have more impact than attempts 
to boost collaborative attitudes within the current cooperative 
federalism design—a design that, in the context of drinking water, has 
not worked all that well. 
So far, none of the reforms proposed or adopted at the state level 
in the wake of Flint entail an acceptance of testing and disclosure 
responsibility on the part of a state, exclusively or shared with local 
water authorities—with one arguable exception.  The Flint Task 
Force Report recommends the implementation of “a school and 
daycare water quality testing program (which could serve as a model 
for the United States), administered collaboratively by [the Michigan 
Department of Environmental Quality] and [the Michigan 
Department of Health and Human Services] that includes 
appropriate sampling and testing for lead contamination for all 
schools and daycare centers in the state and effective reporting of test 
results.”89  It is unclear whether Michigan’s Governor’s proposed 
reform package adopts this recommendation, or even if it does, 
whether such a program will actually be instituted.  But if adopted 
and implemented, it would reflect a partial institutional re-design, 
																																																																																																																																
 87. See Claire Groden, How Michigan’s Bureaucrats Created the Flint Water 
Crisis, FORTUNE (Jan. 20, 2016, 6:00 PM), http://fortune.com/flint-water-crisis/ 
[http://perma.cc/B3XX-6V3F] (noting that “detractors of the [state emergency 
powers] law say that the lack of democracy in Flint prevented the city from making 
careful decisions,” and quoting one NGO leader as arguing that “[w]hen you remove 
all democracy, it’s a system set up for failure, where they’re not accountable to the 
people that they’re serving . . . ”). 
 88. See Warren, supra note 1, at 113–14. 
 89. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 13, 59. 
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marking the first time a state would be the legally responsible actor 
for testing the drinking water supplied by publicly-owned local water 
authorities, albeit in a limited category of sites.90 
V.  THE ROLE OF CITIZEN SUITS 
One of the possible benefits of making states legally responsible or 
co-responsible for testing and disclosure, is that doing so may make 
citizen suits more effective as a means of combatting abdication in our 
drinking water regime.  There have been relatively few citizen suits 
under the SDWA,91 and unlike in other statutory areas of 
environmental law, the SDWA law has not been notably shaped by 
the courts via citizen suit litigation.92  There could be many reasons 
for the lack of SDWA or related state litigation: drinking water, for 
example, may not be as compelling an issue for environmental NGOs 
and their memberships, which have traditionally been focused on 
preserving offshore water quality and water quality in lakes and 
streams, and have been somewhat slow to turn their attention to the 
problem of poor, urban communities.93 
Citizen suit litigation also is a clumsy tool for citizen groups given 
the current allocation of responsibility in our drinking water regime.  
Under current law, citizen groups are more or less limited to suing 
local water authorities for noncompliance,94 but the local water 
authorities that are most noncompliant are also likely to be the ones 
that lack resources to improve compliance, precisely because their 
noncompliance may reflect their lack of resources to take on 
infrastructure improvements.  These localities can argue to courts, 
																																																																																																																																
 90. In addition, a bill has been introduced in the Indiana Legislature that would 
require the state to assume responsibility for testing for lead in drinking water in the 
City of East Chicago, a city where shocking levels of lead soil contamination, lead 
building materials contamination, and lead contamination in the drinking water have 
been documented. See generally H.R. 1344, 120th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2017). 
 91. See Christine L. Rideout, Where are All the Citizen Suits?: The Failure of 
Safe Drinking Water Enforcement in the United States, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 655, 679 
(2011) (discussing the paucity of citizen suit litigation under the SDWA). 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Elizabeth Miller, Part One: Environmental Groups Slow to Seek Out 
Minorities, WXXI NEWS (Sept. 25, 2017), http://wxxinews.org/post/part-one-
environmental-groups-slow-seek-out-minorities [https://perma.cc/U69M-THU6]. 
 94. See Concerned Pastors for Social Action v. Khouri, 194 F. Supp. 3d 589, 604–
05 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (holding that state officials could be sued under SDWA in Flint 
because they had taken over control of the water system from local officials, but 
acknowledging that otherwise state officials could not be sued under SDWA, as they 
would be “immune from suit from the requirements of the SDWA because they are 
not responsible as a ‘supplier of water,’ since they do not ‘own[ ] or operate[ ] a 
public water system.’”). 
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powerfully, that they simply lack the staffing and funding to do much 
better.  Moreover, a suit against a single local water authority by 
definition can only have an impact, if any at all, on the local area in 
question.  To have broad impact, citizen groups would have to sue 
many local water authorities, which would mean many lawsuits or 
sprawling, unwieldy, multi-defendant lawsuits.  Such litigation would 
necessarily entail high transaction costs, and citizen groups 
themselves typically have very limited resources they must try to 
leverage to produce the most benefit. 
Under the current legal regime, a citizen suit usually can only be 
brought by residents against the owner or operator of a local water 
authority where that resident lives.95  It is owners and operators that 
are the legally responsible actors under the SDWA, and the 
implementing state law.96  Although there are at least a few successful 
SDWA citizen suits against states, these cases entailed unusual 
circumstances.97  Generally, citizens face standing and merits 
problems in suing a state under the SDWA, because local authorities 
have primary obligations as regulated entities, whereas a state’s 
obligations are merely those of a regulator.98  As a regulator, a state 
presumptively has broad discretion to decide when and when not to 
take action regarding noncompliance on the part of local water 
authorities. 
However, if, as a matter of state law, the state was legally 
responsible for testing for lead and for disclosure of test results, the 
state could be regarded as an “operator” of local water authorities 
under the SDWA, at least with respect to testing and disclosure 
operations.99  States also could then be sued under state-version 
																																																																																																																																
 95. See id at 597. 
 96. See id at 604–05. 
 97. I searched Westlaw for published citizen suit decisions against a state under 
the SDWA citizen suit provision, and the only examples I found relate to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300j–24, which is unusual in imposing a direct obligation upon a state, to the effect 
that “[e]ach State shall provide for the dissemination of information regarding lead to 
local educational agencies, private nonprofit elementary or secondary schools and to 
day care centers . . . .” See generally Acorn v. Edwards, 842 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. La. 
1993) (holding that citizen groups had standing to sue the state for an alleged 
violation of § 300j–24); Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Romer, 796 F. Supp. 457 (D. Colo. 1992) 
(upholding fee award to environmental plaintiffs in suit alleging violations of § 300j-
24). 
 98. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text (explaining that states act as 
regulators under the SDWA when they assume primacy over implementation and 
enforcement). 
 99. See generally United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (holding that a 
parent corporation can be held liable under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act as operators of a facility owned by a 
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administrative procedure acts for failing to comply with non-
discretionary duties to test and disclose.100  Figure 2, above, shows the 
shift regarding citizen suits with a partial, moderate re-design of the 
SDWA regime. 
Suits against states could be very effective in checking any 
abdication by states with respect to testing and disclosure 
requirements.  In such suits, citizen groups could collect a great deal 
of information in a highly efficient way through discovery, since the 
state being sued, by definition, would have information about what 
testing and disclosure it undertook for all the local water authorities 
under its purview.  As compared to a local water authority, a state 
could much less convincingly argue poverty and lack of resources to a 
court in response to a citizen suit.101  Additionally, such suits would 
create a forum in which citizen groups and the state could negotiate 
as to where it would be most rational for testing and disclosure 
resources to be invested.  A single settlement agreement 
encompassing a state thus could yield much greater net public health 
benefits than a handful of suits against local water authorities. 
Suits by citizen groups against states for failing to test children 
enrolled in the Medicaid program for lead poisoning provides 
something of a model for the kind of litigation citizen groups could 
bring against states for failing to test drinking water and provide 
disclosure.  There is a history of Medicaid suits in which advocates 
pressed for a state to expand and improve its lead testing procedures 
(although the suits were generally aimed at other deficiencies in the 
state’s Medicaid program as well).102  A 1991 settlement of a suit 
																																																																																																																																
subsidiary if the parent corporation directed waste management decisions at the 
facility). 
 100. The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, which many states follow, 
provides for review of final agency action and further provides that “[a] court may 
compel an agency to take action that is unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed.” REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 501(d) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2010). 
 101. Of course, there are some states that are financially strapped (such as Illinois, 
at present), but state budgets are always going to be an order of magnitude greater 
than the budget of any local water authority and thus will appear to have more room 
for funding compliance with a court order.  Moreover, at the end of the day, local 
water authorities and localities generally are limited by state law and regulation as to 
their unilateral ability to impose new taxes or rate increases to fund compliance with 
a court order.  By contrast, States qua States have greater latitude in generating new 
sources of funding. See Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal 
Taxing Authority and What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 301 (2016). 
 102. See, e.g., Ellis ex rel. Ellis v. Wetherbee, No. 96-60434, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 
43306, at *2 (5th Cir. May 5, 1997) (discussing the State of Mississippi’s prior 
settlement agreement to change the policy and procedures of its Early and Periodic 
1356 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
against California required California to test at least 500,000 poor 
children for lead poisoning, after three years of failing to do so in its 
Medicaid clinics.103  Most recently, after a settlement, all children in 
Washington covered by Medicaid will be eligible for lead-poisoning 
testing if their parents request it, they live in old buildings, they are 
recent immigrants, or they face other exposure risks.104  In addition, 
the State of Washington committed to make available a new online 
map that lets residents zoom in on their neighborhoods, down to 
census tracts, to see their relative risk of lead exposure ranked on a 
scale of one to ten, based on income levels and age of housing.105 
VI.  MAKING LEAD CONTAMINATION INFORMATION SALIENT 
There is a consensus among commentators that, regardless of who 
is responsible for testing for lead in water, there must be changes to 
the substance and procedures for testing.106  For one thing, the federal 
action level for finding “too much lead” must be lowered from 15 
parts per billion (ppb) to a lower level that reflects the actual health 
risks posed by lead.107  Michigan’s Governor has proposed lowering 
the standard to 10 ppb, which would be the lowest of any state.108  
																																																																																																																																
Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (“EPSDT”) program); Memisovski ex rel. 
Memisovski v. Maram, No. 92 C 1982, 2004 WL 1878332, at *49 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 
2004); Thompson v. Raiford, No. 3:92-CV-1539-R, 1993 WL 497232, at *2 (N.D.Tex. 
Sept. 24, 1993); N.Y.C. Coal. to End Lead Poisoning v. Giuliani, 720 N.Y.S.2d 298, 
299 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000). 
 103. See Philip J. Hilts, California to Test for Lead Poisoning, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 
1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/12/us/california-to-test-children-for-lead-
poisoning.html [https://perma.cc/XM5Z-WURL]. 
 104. Sandy Doughton, More Children Will Be Tested for Lead Under Settlement, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015, 3:27 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/health/more-children-will-be-tested-for-lead-under-lawsuit-settlement/ 
[https://perma.cc/UZR4-XHDA]. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See Dennis, supra note 28. 
 107. See Tom Neltner, Household Action Level for Lead in Water: EPA Needs to 
Release Health-based Estimate, ENVTL. DEF. FUND: HEALTH BLOG (Mar. 25, 2016), 
http://blogs.edf.org/health/2016/03/25/lead-hal/ [https://perma.cc/5EEF-6YVU]; see 
also Laura Unger, Lawmakers Urge the EPA to Reduce Its Standard for Lead in 
Drinking Water, USA TODAY (July 1, 2016, 10:23 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/2016/06/30/lawmakers-urge-epa-reduce-its-standard-lead-drinking-water/
86576032/ [https://perma.cc/8LTS-DSSA]. 
 108. See Chad Livengood, Snyder Proposes Tougher Regulations for Lead in 
Water, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.detroitnews.com/
story/news/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/04/15/michigan-urge-toughest-lead-test-
rules/83071228/ [https://perma.cc/52TR-Z6BG] (“The proposal appears to be ‘the 
lowest state standard in the country,’ said Doug Farquhar, program director for 
environmental health at the National Conference of State Legislatures.”); see also 
Ellison, supra note 42 (quoting Virginia Tech’s Marc Edwards as explaining that 
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Moreover, testing must be done more frequently and expansively in 
each locality, and with fewer possibilities for manipulation, if the data 
is to have any integrity.109 
For information about lead in water to matter, both in influencing 
people’s personal behavior and in politics, it must be salient to 
people—it must be something they can readily access, understand and 
integrate.  Dry, technical information available in a form letter or 
buried in a report on file with a government office will not be 
effective in communicating to people the need to take action.110  In 
other words, for testing and disclosure to increase political salience, 
the public disclosure itself must be salient to the intended audience: 
residents, community members, and the media. 
It seems obvious that salience presupposes at least ready 
availability: the easier the information is to access, the more salient it 
may be, whatever its form.  The available social science also suggests 
that salience of disclosure is enhanced when it takes the form of 
graphics or other visual representations: a bright flashing warning 
light may be more effective than numbers or text stating that a test 
shows a contaminant level exceeds federal or state action levels.111  
Risk communication is also more effective when the recipient of the 
																																																																																																																																
advocates believe the standard ideally should be 5 ppb, but acknowledge that the 
costs of achieving that standard would be too high given other demands for public 
funds). 
 109. To this end, the EPA’s National Drinking Water Advisory Council has 
recommended “that a voluntary customer-initiated sampling program based on a 
more robust and targeted public education be substituted for the current LCR tap 
sampling requirements.” EPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 13. 
 110. The EPA White Paper recognized the need for more effective communication 
with the public. See id. at 15 (“EPA is considering modifications to the rule to 
strengthen the public education requirements by requiring ongoing, proactive and 
targeted public education to effectively communicate drinking water lead risks . . . ”). 
 111. Dolores J. Severtson & Jeffrey B. Henriques, The Effect of Graphics on 
Environmental Health Risk Beliefs, Behavioral Intentions, and Recall, 29 RISK 
ANALYSIS 1549, 1549–50, 1563 (2009) (“Findings show moderately strong positive 
relationships between water test results, safety beliefs, and mitigation behavior . . . .  
[A] test result compared to a safety standard provides concrete evidence of an unseen 
risk and is therefore more powerful than abstract risk information . . . .  Graphical 
representations can make abstract information more concrete and have been 
recommended for conveying environmental monitoring information as it relates to 
safety standards or benchmarks . . . .  Typically used phrases such as ‘exceeds the 
standard’ or ‘above the standard’ were sometimes misunderstood . . . .  Visualization 
can make information easier to understand . . . .  The strategic use of evidence-based 
visual features can address literacy and numeracy barriers by facilitating automatic 
comprehension . . . .  Results suggest that images designed to convey the meaning of 
risk information can close the gap between the intended and imparted meaning of 
environmental health risk information.”). 
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information is offered a depiction that shows how close he or she lives 
and works to sites where tests have shown contamination.112 
Recent and proposed reforms in lead testing of water might 
enhance the salience of disclosures to some degree.  These reforms 
need to be actually implemented and strengthened to ensure that 
better testing for lead produces not just more information, but more 
impact on the recipients of the information and, ultimately, greater 
political salience. 
The LCR does not require any testing for lead at the ninety 
percent of schools or day care centers that receive water from a public 
water system.113  In the wake of the uproar over Flint, Michigan’s 
Governor has proposed annual testing at schools and day care 
centers, and recently enacted legislation in Ohio and Illinois require 
such testing.114  Such testing, of course, is plainly sensible, as schools 
and day care centers are potential exposure sites for children.  But the 
testing data from schools and day care centers is also notable because 
it is likely to be more salient in communities than data from selected 
individual homes.  A letter sent to your home regarding testing at a 
number of houses in the general community—but not at your house—
is much more readily overlooked than a notice that the water at your 
child’s school has a level that violates the federal standard.  
Moreover, notices to parents about such data can spark conversations 
and mutual exchanges among parents and educators, so that even 
parents who might not understand or pay attention to notices can 
come to appreciate what they mean.  Neighborhood schools, which 
often have established parents’ groups and large meeting spaces, are 
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natural focal points for community organizing, including organizing 
for action regarding the problem of lead. 
No jurisdiction has moved toward a highly salient way of depicting 
lead testing results, such as an interactive map that would show how 
close or far testing sites are from one’s own home and how much the 
results at each site exceeded the legal limit for lead.  For its part, in its 
October 2016 White Paper, the EPA reported that it was considering 
“[r]equiring drinking water utilities to post all LCR sampling results 
and sample invalidation justifications on their publicly accessible 
website in a form that protects the privacy of customers.”115  But the 
EPA has not taken any action in this regard, and neither have the 
states. 
The EPA, however, has called on local water authorities to map 
what they know regarding the location of public and private lead 
service lines, and to make those maps available to the public.116  Ohio 
has taken the lead in this regard.  A recent Ohio law, enacted in June 
2016, requires that “every public water system in the state identify 
and map the locations of lead piping in their entire service areas.”117  
Public water authorities in Ohio have been given discretion as to how 
to achieve mapping, and at least one—Cincinnati—has undertaken it 
in a way that is well-designed to make the information as available 
and vivid, and hence salient, as possible.118  Cincinnati chose to follow 
the approach already in place in Washington, D.C., which makes it 
easy for a resident to check whether his or her residence is connected 
to a public service line containing lead by using a detailed online 
map.119  The map also allows the resident to see whether there is 
information indicating that the private service line for his or her home 
also contains lead.120  All a resident needs to do is enter his or her 
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address.121  Cincinnati, again following the Washington, D.C. 
approach, invites customers to submit updated information to the 
utility by email.122  As one commentator notes, “[t]his level of detail 
allows any consumer to make informed choices whether they are 
buying or renting a home, picking a child-care facility, or deciding 
whether to use a filter.”123  Figure 3, below, is a screen shot of the 
widely-praised interactive map used in Washington, D.C., in which a 
green dot signifies a lead-free service line; a grey dot signifies a lead 
service line; and a white dot indicates a lack of information as to 
whether the line contains lead.124 
 
Figure 3. Map of Public Service Lines in Washington D.C.125 
																																																																																																																																
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Lyndsay McCormick, Mapping Lead Service Lines: DC Water Offers a Model 
for Utilities Across the Nation, ENVTL. DEF. FUND: HEALTH BLOG (July 25, 2016), 
http://blogs.edf.org/health/2016/07/25/mapping-lead-service-lines-dc-water-offers-a-
model-for-utilities-across-the-nation/ [https://perma.cc/9SKX-WZQD]. 
 125. Id.; see DC Water Service Information, D.C. WATER, https://geo.dcwater.com/
Lead/ [https://perma.cc/VS8M-4WWM]. 
2017] LEGAL REFORM AFTER FLINT 1361 
While there have been a few improvements in making information 
regarding lead testing more salient to affected residents, and hence 
more likely to form the basis of meaningful personal and political 
action, there is still much more that could be done.  Most states do 
not have testing at schools on a regular basis or at all; test results are 
not communicated in accessible maps; and effective mapping 
regarding the location of public and private lead service lines is in 
place in some, but by no means most, jurisdictions.  Even if states did 
accept greater legal responsibility for testing, and if testing were to 
improve, the issue of lead in water may not gain political salience 
unless there is more effective, more salient disclosure of test results. 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding analysis builds on the recognition that our regime 
for drinking water regulation entails a triple abdication—by the 
federal and state governments as regulators and by local authorities 
as regulated entities serving water consumers.  A lack of political 
salience surrounding the problem of lead in water best explains this 
abdication.  This Article proposes an institutional re-design (making 
states directly, legally responsible for testing and disclosure) as well as 
a change in testing disclosure (making it more accessible and vivid) as 
ways to heighten the political salience of the lead problem and 
perhaps make possible the kind of federal and state funding needed 
to fully address it. 
This approach depends on legislative and regulatory action at the 
state level, and the political climate in some states may make that 
impossible.  However, while it is true that states sometimes engage in 
races to the bottom, other times there are races to the top with states 
copying best practices adopted elsewhere.  We could see such a 
phenomenon regarding lead in water.126  If nothing else, should one 
or more states adopt a “model” state-based regime with effective 
testing and disclosure, advocates in other states could point to that 
model as part of their own advocacy.  Moreover, if a number of states 
adopted the strategy proposed in this Article, it might change the 
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political economy at the federal level to make it more likely that 
Congress would amend the SDWA and require states to share testing 
and disclosure responsibilities with localities in return for federal 
infrastructure funding.127 
This approach also relies heavily on the power of information, and 
informational approaches have their limits.  Particularly for otherwise 
distressed communities, more information simply may not be 
something they have the wherewithal to fully absorb and act upon.  
Conversely, information about health risks can also prompt 
overreactions or non-adaptive reactions—such as not running one’s 
tap at home except when absolutely necessary because of a fear of 
lead, which has the effect of increasing lead concentrations in the 
water that one does use.128  Public education can address the problem 
of such reactions, and that too has to be part of the response to the 
problem of lead in water.129 
Continuing with our current regime is simply not a tenable option, 
because lead is one clear danger we can identify and eliminate.  Too 
little has been done to address the problem of lead in water under the 
current institutional design, so a re-design is needed, not just a 
tweaking of current rules.  In re-designing the regime for lead 
contamination in water, moreover, we may gain a better 
understanding of how to address the broader problem of abdication 
in environmental law. 
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